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Hensher, Ho and Mulley 
 
1. Introduction 
 
There is much discussion about the presence of transaction costs imposed on the operator and the 
regulator associated with both competitively tendered and negotiated bus contracts when an incumbent 
is unsuccessful and a new operator takes over. Specifically, it is suggested that the elements of quality 
and reputation of a bidder is not taken into account in respect of their reputation and history of success 
or otherwise in service delivery under various contract regimes when tender bids are evaluated. These 
elements may well be a proxy for the ability to minimise the transition costs by the operator winning 
the contract, over and above their own private transition costs, Although an experienced operator will 
factor their private transition costs into their offer price (and amortise these over the life of the contract), 
there will nevertheless be a set of additional costs that are incurred by government and service users 
resulting from a change in operator.  These range from potential labour disruption from changes in take 
home wages or contracts, additional contract negotiation costs 1 , and service changes that create 
concerns for passengers as the new operator finds their feet in terms of route and service knowledge. 
Whilst some of these impacts cannot be easily measured in dollar terms, they can at least be included 
in a benefit assessment using a formal preference model that expresses these influences (in aggregate) 
as an additional source of loss of service value.  
 
To demonstrate the importance of this topic, we use an example centred on the value for money idea 
that government promotes to justify competitive tendering (Hensher and Stanley 2010) to show why 
accounting for transition costs that are not internalised by the operator in their offer price should be 
taken into account. The example concerns a recent transfer of an operator under competitive tendering, 
where the incoming operator had prepared a new roster for drivers which reduced overtime and 
therefore take home pay, and which had been factored into a lower bid price.  When the new operator 
advised the drivers of the lower pay, many of whom were employed previously by the losing incumbent, 
the drivers went on strike. There was a period of no services and significant reputational damage to the 
new operator. This was also made worse by a planned change in the timetable on some routes. This was 
not a good outcome for the government since customers complained. These are examples of disruption 
costs in bus contract transitions, more generally called transition costs. 
 
The winner of a competitive tender may not be the operator whose offer price plus these additional 
transition costs (in its broadest interpretation) is the lowest, even if their offer price is the lowest in the 
tender process.  Given the dominant role that the lowest offer price typically plays in the evaluation of 
competitive tenders and negotiated offers, even taking into account other key performance indicators2 
may result in a change in operator leading to greater total costs. This situation has not been investigated 
adequately3 to see if transition costs, as perceived or anticipated potential costs are appropriately taken 
into account by members of the tender evaluation committee. Thus the focus of this paper is on the role, 
in competitive tendering or negotiation of a bus contract, of the potential disruption risk associated with 
contract transition and the role this plays in offer evaluation, as defined as an additional cost associated 
with a transition to a new operator. 
1 An example in another context is that when comparing private sector bids to the public sector comparator, it is 
important to ensure that the cost savings from using a public-private partnership arrangement is not outweighed 
by the transition and oversight costs (European Investment Bank, 2005). 
2 KPIs in some assessments are given a percentage allocation to be used in assessment of bids, but this does not 
necessarily ensure compliance.  
3 Wallis et al. (2010) did discuss this and suggested a mark up cost. 
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To examine these important questions, we develop a stated choice experiment in which we present 
tender evaluation committee members with a series of alternative operator bids that include, ex ante, a 
measure of the transition costs identified as a proportion of the lowest offer for the contract (noting that 
this is zero if the incumbent secures the contract) and two proxy descriptors of operator reputation (i.e., 
years in the bus business and success rate in winning contracts). The magnitude of the actual mark up 
(often referred to as a transaction or transition cost) is typically unknown (except possibly by the 
regulator and/or the incoming operator). Our focus here is on the mark up incurred beyond the costs to 
an operator4 and includes the potential disruption to services associated with labour strikes5, revised 
timetables, delays in securing new vehicles, and the additional administration costs to government 
associated with moving to a new provider.6 These costs are rarely certain, except in the case of the 
incumbent securing the contract, and hence these enter the choice experiment probabilistically, which 
in turn offers information on the attitude to risk of the evaluators. 
 
The analysis uses a mixed logit model (see Hensher et al. 2015) that accounts for preference 
heterogeneity in respect of evaluation of offers of the sample of individuals who have participated in 
the evaluation of bids under competitive tendering in a number of countries.  This enables identification 
of the role that operator reputation and the offer mark up plays in addition to the offer price in the 
ranking of operators to establish the preferred provider. These additional influences can be described as 
embedded components of the transaction costs imposed on the regulator and society more generally 
when there is a contract transition. The mixed logit preference model permits the quantification of the 
implicit value attached to these additional elements, expressed as an aggregated measure of the value 
(in utility terms) of the contract offer.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. The next section sets out how to identify the role of transition costs 
in influencing the preferences of tender evaluation committee members (even if these preferences are 
typically included in a subconscious manner). We then present the mixed logit model, as the choice 
setting in which to identify the role of such transition costs and other potential factors that impact on 
the evaluators rankings of operator offers. The survey is then presented together with details of how the 
choice experiment is designed. The collected data from a small sample of actual tender evaluation 
committee members is then summarised, followed by the estimated choice model results and the 
interpretation of the evidence. We conclude with the major findings and the importance of this paper in 
identifying, for the first time, the role that disruption costs in bus contract transitions play, consciously 
or otherwise, in the preferences of assessors. 
 
 
 
4 The incoming operator is also likely to incur transition costs but one might reasonably expect experienced 
operators to factor this into their offer price. If they do not then it adds to the risk of the winner’s curse. 
5 As witnessed when there was a transfer of operators in Sydney in September 2013. 
6 The survey also included another experiment which we are not focussing on in this paper. This choice experiment 
presented a series of alternative sets of criteria that are the basis of evaluating tendered or negotiated offers, defined 
on a range of commonly used KPIs plus additional variables describing the reputation of the bidder in terms of 
recent success in winning contracts and years in the bus business. Respondents were asked to rank the criteria sets 
and to advise which ones are acceptable sets in assessing offers. This experiment helps us in identifying the role 
that cost efficiency (which is essentially the offer price) plays relative to other KPIs, including the reputation of 
an operator. 
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2. Accounting for Reputational Risk in the Assessment of 
Contracting Offers 
It is often suggested that competitive bidding incurs higher levels of transactions costs than negotiated 
contracts, especially where the latter is initially with an incumbent operator. The logic goes along the 
following lines: negotiation with an incumbent operator who is well known to the regulator through an 
existing contract in the exact jurisdiction under renewal7 provides lower transaction costs in that there 
is more common knowledge (be it positive or negative), enabling a greater focus on the delivery of 
future services without the necessary background checks and relationship building (in the sense of a 
trusted partnership) as well as risks associated with disruptions associated with changes in service inputs 
such as labour and capital.  
 
It takes time to build such relationships, although the principal and agent must unambiguously be at 
‘arms length’ under a commercial agreement. Nevertheless an underlying degree of trust is a necessary 
and constructive element of such relationships, be it obtained through negotiation or competitive 
tendering. While there will always be the risk of regulatory capture, a transparent process in which KPI 
expectations are clearly publicised should assist in minimising (if not eliminating) such concerns. 
 
If transactions costs beyond those experienced by the operator play a significant role in the evaluation 
process, and by implication are costs that are not factored into the comparison of offer prices (no matter 
what process is in place), then strictly they are a cost attached to a contract, and should be added to the 
final price as an additional component of the value for money statement. Identifying such costs is 
challenging, but it is reasonable to assume that they are related to the reputation of the bidder or 
negotiator, and can be measured by proxy variables such as years of experience in the industry and the 
record of contract winning and renewal.  
 
Identifying the contribution that these proxy variables play in offer assessment will not only establish 
their relevance, but also suggest some mark up, as defined relative to the influence of other KPIs that 
are explicitly defined and used in the assessment process. This provides one way of establishing the 
contribution of such variables as proxies for transactions costs on a preference scale that can be 
converted to a dollar value in the sense of their relative influence on value assessment associated with 
competing bids.  
 
Consider a regulator who wishes to procure a bus service, be it a renewal through tendering or 
negotiation. If the service is provided according to the regulator’s needs, the regulator will obtain a 
value of v*. For a service to be designed and delivered, the regulator must provide the operator with a 
specification that describes the delivered service. In assessing the offer bids, the specification is laid out 
and a number of KPIs are used to assess each of the offers. Formally, we might define a set of explicit 
or observed KPIs that each member of the offer evaluation team considers in choosing the preferred 
operator. It is also likely that there exists an element of ambiguity in the set of KPIs as understood by 
each member of the evaluation team. Furthermore, there may be other considerations that influence the 
7 There may be many circumstances where an operator submitted a tender bid is not the incumbent but is well 
known and trusted by the jurisdiction assessing bids, because of their dealing in other locations; and thus it does 
not follow that the incumbent will necessarily have a strategic advantage in respect of perceptions about 
transitioning to the next contract. 
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offer outcome which are not explicit in the defined set of KPIs. We might refer to these as soft variables 
which condition each evaluator’s position on each offer, and may include the perceived reputation of 
the offering bus business as defined by many possible factors including the success rate in the past in 
winning contracts and the reputation in delivering on all KPIs without default. 
 
Formally, we can define the preference function associated with each evaluator as Equation (1), where 
each explicit KPI has a weight attached to it that indicates the role it plays in how an assessor trades 
amongst the set of KPIs in ranking the offers (including cut offs defining eligible and non-eligible 
offers). It is likely that each evaluator will have a position in respect of the degree of risk associated 
with each offer as based on other implicit (or subconscious) influences. 
 
1 1
KPI SV
okpi osvon on ononkpi onsv
kpi sv
U OSC X Zβ γ ε
= =
= + +∑ ∑ +        (1) 
 
Uon is the overall level of utility that the nth evaluator attaches to the oth offer, Xokpi is the set of well 
documented and essentially prescriptive KPIs whose influence in the evaluation process is represented 
by the parameters βonkpi, which define the marginal utility contribution of each KPI to overall evaluator 
utility assigned to a specific bid offer. OSCon is the offer-specific constant associated with the role, on 
average, of the set of unobserved influences associated with the nth evaluator’s preference for the oth 
offer. In addition, there are the less well defined potential influences which we have defined by three 
proxy variables within Zosv (i.e., years in the bus business, success rate in winning contracts, and non-
operator transition costs), each associated with their own marginal utility metric γonsv. There will also 
exist other unobserved influences that potentially influence each evaluator’s assessment preferences, 
and which are accommodated within εon, assumed to be distributed randomly across the operator bids 
and evaluators.  
 
The changeover cost is a mark up on the lowest offer price. This variable, unlike the other more factual 
attributes, has an element of risk attached to it and is best treated as a range of possible mark-ups, each 
associated with a probability of occurrence. This form of presentation is aligned with the literature on 
perceptual conditioning and risk attitude, associated initially with the prospect theory (see Kanemann 
and Tversky 1979, and a review by Li and Hensher 2011).  
 
3. The Mixed Logit Model 
 
Under random utility maximisation (RUM), evaluators are assumed to impose preferences that support 
the offer which maximises utility. The mixed logit model is well documented in many sources (e.g., 
Hensher et al. 2015) and herein we provide a summary of the main elements. The central equation for 
the choice probability is: 
 
,o
,o1
exp( )
Prob[choice o by assessor  in tender assessment choice situation  ] = 
exp( )n
nt n
O
nt no
n t
=
′
′∑
x
x
β
β
= Pnt|v (2) 
 
The K model parameters are continuously distributed across individuals with 
 
βn  =  β + ∆zn + Γvn         (3) 
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where zn may be a vector of individual characteristics that affect the mean of the random parameter 
distribution and ∆ is the associated parameter matrix.  The underlying random effect, vn is characterised 
by 
 
E[vn]  =  0, Var[vn]  =  Σ = diag[σ1,…,σK]      (4) 
 
where σk is a known constant.  The variances and covariances of the joint distribution of βn are 
parameterised in the unknown lower triangular matrix Γ which is to be estimated.  The variance of the 
distribution of the parameters is  
 
                         Ω = ΓΣΓ′                                                                                       (5) 
 
Tn observations are made on each evaluator (i.e., choice tasks).  The conditional contribution to the 
likelihood is 
 
n n 1
P |v = |nT ntt nP=∏ v          (6) 
 
In order to form the unconditional likelihood, it is necessary to integrate vn out of the joint probability.  
Thus, 
 
| ( )
n
n n n n nP P h d= ∫v v v v         (7) 
 
where h(vn) is the density of the standardised random vector vn. The likelihood expression can be 
enumerated through maximising the simulated log likelihood function: 
 
1 1
1ln ln ln |N Rs n nrn rL PR= =
 =   
∑ ∑ v        (8) 
 
where vnr is a simulated random draw from the assumed distribution.   
 
 
4. Development of the Sample and the Survey Instrument 
 
The central feature of the survey instrument is a choice experiment, complemented by background 
questions (See Appendix A) on the experience of each respondent in the assessment of competitively 
tendered and/or negotiated bus contracts.  
 
A stated choice experiment is developed in which the combinations of levels of each selected attribute 
are systematically varied to define a number of operator offers (see Hensher et al. 2015). Four attributes 
have been selected to describe the bidders, with the attributes and the levels to be assessed shown in 
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Table 1, and an illustrative choice scenario in Figure 1. In designing a choice experiment, the task is to 
find combinations of levels of the attributes that provide the best statistical outcome in respect of the 
efficiency of the design given the number of choice sets obtained, that will be blocked and assigned to 
each assessor such that the number of choice scenarios is a manageable number. We have chosen the 
D-efficient design which aims to minimise all (co)variances of all parameter estimates. In order to 
generate the D-efficient designs, it is necessary to assume prior parameter estimates. If these cannot be 
obtained from a pilot survey and are not known from other sources, as is the case herein, one can impose 
at least a sign condition, for example, the higher bid offer is likely to engender a negative parameter 
estimate. Ngene (Choice Metrics 2012) is used to generate the choice experiment design. The efficient 
design generated 20 choice scenarios which were blocked into four sets of five scenarios, and each 
operator was assigned one of the four blocks to review and respond to. 
 
Table 1: The attributes and levels defining the choice experiment 
 
Description of operator (attribute) Attribute level 
Incumbent (current holder of contract) Yes, No 
Offer price (LOP = Lowest Offer Price) LOP, LOP + 10%, LOP + 15%, LOP + 20% 
Years operator has been in the business 5, 10, 15, 30 years 
Operator success rate in winning contracts (%) 5%, 30%, 50%, 80% 
Changeover cost as % mark up on LOP 0%, 1%, 5%, 15%, 20%, 25% 
Chance of changeover cost occurring 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%, 60%, 70%, 80% 
 
 
 
6 
 
Disruption Costs in Bus Contract Transitions 
Hensher, Ho and Mulley 
 
 
 
Figure 1: An illustrative choice screen 
 
 
To enable us to implement the survey in many jurisdictions, with regulators around the world being 
invited to provide their views on the assessment strategies, we define each attribute and its levels in 
such a way that it was meaningful to all settings. The offer price would not make any sense in currency 
terms, and is best expressed as percentage variations from the lowest offer price (LOP), noting that the 
LOP can be assigned through the experimental design to any of the three operators labelled as Operators 
A, B, and C. The two selected operator reputational attributes are both easy to understand in any setting, 
and are the number of years that an operator has been in the bus business and the operator’s success rate 
in winning contracts. We left this open to the respondents to interpret in respect of the number of years, 
in order to avoid the risk of limiting the response to a period in which the success rate may be high or 
low relative to some broad average. The fourth attribute, of special interest, is the estimated changeover 
cost as a percentage mark-up on the lowest offer price. These costs are defined as additional to any costs 
incurred by an operator, in where the latter are assumed to be factored into the operator’s offer price. 
Given the uncertainty of the mark up, changeover costs associated with non-incumbent operators are 
defined in terms of the distribution with three levels, each having a probability of occurrence. 
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Three responses were sought from each evaluator when considering the three operator’s bids in a choice 
scenario. We first requested a ranking of all three operators with 1 indicating the most preferred offer, 
and 3 the least preferred offer. This was followed by a question to establish which offers an evaluator 
deemed eligible (i.e., it would be in a final considered set as meeting the necessary compliance 
conditions). In recognition that not all attributes may have been attended to in assessment, we also 
sought advice on the reasons why an operator is deemed ineligible to the evaluator with one possible 
reason being the irrelevance of an attribute to the evaluator.  
 
Given the nature of the study, it was essential that the respondents were members of a tender/negotiation 
evaluation team in the past or currently. Sourcing participants involved contacting key individuals in 
various countries who were known to us8 and who were able to advise on eligible participants. Most 
importantly they also agreed to encourage the persons they put forward to participate in the survey. 
 
The survey was designed as an online instrument. Each respondent was invited to participate via e-mail 
with a full explanation of the aims of the study and reference to a person who had suggested their 
participation. We identified 64 assessors from nine countries (Australia, New Zealand, UK, Chile, 
Singapore, Sweden, Malta, Switzerland and South Africa). The survey commenced in February 2015 
and continued up to May 2015, after a pilot check on the instrument. Securing completed surveys from 
evaluators was challenging, with repeated reminders and a number of one-on-one phone calls and email 
meetings to explain the survey. A number of potential participants struggled to see how to contribute 
since they attempted to link the choice scenarios to their past experience instead of responding to the 
request to evaluate the circumstance as if this was the information in front of them in the future. After 
repeated follow ups, we closed the survey at 17 effective responses (a response rate of 26.5%), but one 
was dropped in the analysis due to concerns over the response. The 16 responses (3 from Australia, 4 
from Switzerland, 6 from Chile, 2 from New Zealand and 1 from Singapore) on five choice scenarios 
provided 80 observations (associated with three alternatives) for choice model estimation. This is 
sufficient data to obtain interesting (albeit preliminary) evidence9. 
 
5. Descriptive Profile of sample 
 
Table 2 provides a profile of the sampled evaluators. On average, in the last ten years an evaluator was 
involved in 8.5 evaluations, or slightly less than one evaluation per year. Most of the evaluations 
involved competitive tendering which reflects the increasing numbers of jurisdictions moving to 
competitive tendering for their land based public transport. The evaluators identified that about 3.0 out 
of 8.5 evaluations over the last ten years had been negotiated contracts with most of these being with 
the incumbents. On average, evaluation committees consist of 5.6 members with the majority of 
members (13 out of 16 respondents) believing they had equal voting rights when it came to selecting 
the preferred operator. On average, each evaluation committee used six selection criteria to assess the 
bidders/negotiators and 44 percent of the assessors (7 committee members) said that operator reputation 
played a role in the evaluation process. When asked to reveal an indicator for operator reputation, most 
assessors listed ‘experience in operating public transport services’ as the most important, followed by 
proven track record and the ability to demonstrate innovation and cooperation with the government in 
8 We are especially indebted to Ian Wallis, Tim Arbuckle, Juan Carlos Munoz and Waiyan Leong. 
9 While the variability in data over 80 observations applies for the design attributes, the other data varies only 
across the 17 observatioins, and this has limited the potential role that such data items might play. 
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order to improve services. Financial strength and fleet size were also mentioned as a proxy for the 
operator reputation but by only one evaluator. The results support the use of years in business as a proxy 
for measuring operator reputation in the stated choice experiment as a way to help evaluation 
committees estimate changeover costs associated with new operators, if this is to be added to the offer 
price for comparison. 
 
Table 2 Profile of the assessors and the nature of the assessments  
  Mean/Median 
Total number of assessments involved in last 10 years 8.5* 
Number of negotiated assessments involved in last 10 years 3.0* 
Negotiated assessment with incumbents 2.5* 
Minimum number of operators entered in the assessment process  2.1 
Maximum number of operators entered in the assessment process 7.8 
Number of committee members 5.6 
Committee members have equal voting rights 81% 
Rules to permit politicians to override the committee’s suggestion 25% 
Number of assessment criteria (KPIs) 6.2 
Operator reputation plays a role in assessment 44% 
* indicates median value.   
 
In terms of selection criteria, it is interesting to see a consistent set of KPIs considered by evaluators 
across different jurisdictions. Out of an average set of six selection criteria reported to be actually used 
in the evaluation process (Table 2), Table 3 shows that service reliability and cost efficiency were 
deemed as relevant by all evaluators. Also important are operator indicators of customer service, safety 
and asset conditions. A proxy for operator reputation – number of years in the business – is considered 
equal rank in importance as patronage growth, while other KPIs such as information, provision of assets 
if incumbent is not provided, and social welfare are slightly less important. Of the 11 KPIs listed for 
evaluators to rank, operator success rate in winning contracts is the least important with only a quarter 
of assessors (4 out of 16) identifying it as important enough to be considered as a selection criterion in 
the evaluation process. It is also worth a mention that the ranking of KPIs in Table 3 is largely consistent 
with that in real world assessment processes. That is, service reliability was used as a selection criterion 
by 75% of the committees in their last assessment, with the numbers for cost efficiency, customer 
service, safety and asset conditions being 94%, 50%, 44%, and 50% respectively. Patronage growth 
and years in business were used by 38% of the committees in their last evaluations while information 
provision was used by 19% of the evaluation committees, social welfare aspects and asset provision 
13%, and operator success rate in winning contracts only 6%. 
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Table 3 KPIs that regulators think should be in the assessment process and their rank 
Key Performance Indicator (KPI)* No. assessors deemed relevant 
Average 
rank 
Highest 
rank 
Lowest 
Rank 
Service reliability (rate of on-time services; 
cancelled/incomplete services, punctual headways) 
16 2.0 1 4 
Financial (cost efficiency measured by $/km 
service or $/hour service) 
16 2.7 1 7 
Customer services (Complaints per boarding; 
complaint resolution; customer satisfaction; etc.) 
14 2.9 1 10 
Safety (number of major defects; preventable 
accidents; major incidents) 
14 3.8 1 9 
Asset condition (depots, vehicle fleet, fleet age, 
other critical systems) 
14 4.8 1 8 
Patronage (growth in passenger km per annum; 
passenger crowding; revenue collection rate) 
9 4.8 1 8 
Years operator has been in the business 9 5.3 1 10 
Information (for regulator, passengers and third 
party) 
8 5.8 3 8 
Social welfare (social inclusion including 
affordability; accessibility for users) 
8 7.6 2 11 
Ability to provide assets if incumbent will not 
hand over 
8 7.6 2 10 
Operator success rate in winning contracts 4 9.3 4 11 
* See Appendix A for a detailed description of each KPI.         
 
6. Key Findings 
 
A series of mixed logit models were estimated, in which we investigated the role of each of the attributes 
in the choice experiment. The changeover cost was transformed to a probability weighted cost, and 
together with the other attributes included with both random and non-random taste weight in order to 
establish the extent of preference heterogeneity. We considered a number of distributional assumptions 
for the random parameters, particularly unconstrained and constrained normal and triangular 
distributions. The best statistical fit was with the constrained triangular distribution10 which specifies 
that the mean of the distribution is a free parameter, β, but the two endpoints of the distribution are 
fixed at zero and 2β, so there is no free variance (scaling) parameter. The parameter will satisfy a single 
sign, which is behaviourally appealing when the sign is expected to be either positive or negative as in 
the offer price and the changeover cost, both hypothesised to have a negative sign. Other attributes such 
as operator success rate could go either way; however the analysis herein suggested that a constrained 
triangular was the only distribution that obtained a statistically significant standard deviation parameter 
estimate (possibly dues to the relatively small sample size and hence limits of preference heterogeneity), 
which is shown in the results to be negative. 
10 Let c be the centre and s the spread. The density starts at c-s, rises linearly to c, and then drops linearly to c+s. 
It is zero below c-s and above c+s. The mean and mode are c. The standard deviation is the spread divided by
 
6
; hence the spread is the standard deviation times
 
6 . The height of the tent at c is 1/s (such that each side of the 
tent has area s×(1/s)×(1/2)=1/2, and both sides have area 1/2+1/2=1, as required for a density). The slope is 1/s2.   
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The final model is summarised in Table 3. We accounted for the correlation between respondent’s 
choices across five scenarios that each evaluator was asked to review and rank. We also considered 
scaled multinomial logit and latent class models but they were not an improvement over the standard 
random parameters model form.11 The alternatives are unlabelled and hence an offer-specific constant 
(OSCon) is not included. The overall goodness of fit is very good with a pseudo R2 of 0.409. We were 
unable to identify any statistically significant influences beyond those investigated in the stated choice 
experiment. We believe that this is due to the small sample size of 17 assessors, and as we increase the 
sample size in ongoing research, we can test for the role of other KPIs.  
 
Table 3: Preferred Mixed Logit Model 
16 assessors, 80 observations, 200 Halton draws 
 
 
The negative sign for the offer price and the changeover cost mark up are expected; however the sign 
for the operator success rate in winning contracts is less clear and could have gone either way. One 
evaluator indicated that they are cautious of operators who promote prior success, and stated in the 
open-ended survey responses that “…a high success rate such as 80 percent indicates an irresponsible 
pricing policy and tends to drives poor service quality. In addition, these operators are typically 
aggressive bidders, and this often comes with higher associated changeover cost.” It appears that this 
sentiment is translated throughout the majority of the evaluator set in the negative parameter estimate.  
 
The main focus of the study is to establish the role that soft variables may play, and to see if the 
changeover cost has a role (subconsciously in most situations). What is interesting is the statistical non-
significance of the number of years that an operator has been in the bus service business12 and whether 
they are the incumbent or not. However, the changeover cost associated with transaction costs (or costs 
11 An error components mixed logit model makes no behavioural sense with unlabelled alternatives (although 
right to left bias could be accounted for if it is found to be present). 
12 Which may not be an appropriate representation of experience in operating public transport services which was 
suggested by assessors as of relevance. 
Attribute 
Parameter 
estimate 
t-ratio 
Mean of random parameters   
Offer price as % mark up on lowest offer price (LOP) -0.1474 -4.79 
Operator success rate in winning contracts (%)  -0.0130 -2.06 
Weighted changeover cost as % mark up on LOP* -0.0948 -3.71 
Standard deviation of random parameters   
Offer price as % mark up on LOP -0.1474 -4.79 
Operator success rate in winning contracts (%)  -0.0130 -2.06 
Weighted changeover cost as % mark up on LOP* -0.0948 -3.71 
Model summary statistics   
Log-likelihood at convergence -51.88  
McFadden pseudo R2 0.409  
Information criterion AIC/N 1.372   
* 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑊𝑊𝑎𝑎 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 = ∑ 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖3𝑖𝑖=1 𝑥𝑥 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑊𝑊𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  
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of transition and possible disruption) is statistically very significant and reaffirms what we thought 
might be the case. The parameter estimates per se, however, have little meaning in comparing the 
influence of each significant attribute; what is of more behavioural interest is the construction of the 
marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between the offer price and the changeover cost. Given that the two 
attributes of interest are random parameters, there is a distribution of MRS to account for preference 
heterogeneity, as summarised in Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2: Marginal rate of substitution between offer price and changeover cost 
 
The mean is 1.62 (a median of 1.51) with a standard deviation of 0.13 and a range from 0.88 to 2.60. 
Given the skewness of the data (i.e., a deviation from a normal distribution which explains the difference 
between the mean and the median), we will interpret the median as the best estimate of the relationship 
between the offer price and the risk aligned changeover cost. The estimate of 1.51 indicates that on 
average, a member of a competitive tender evaluation team values a 1% higher changeover cost (as a 
probability weighted estimate) as equivalent to a 1.51 percent higher offer price, ceteris paribus. This 
might be interpreted as a relative risk index. In other words, they would be indifferent between an 
additional 1.51 percent increase in the offer price and a one percent increase in the changeover cost, 
both measured as a percentage mark up on the lowest offered price. Another way of putting this is that, 
on average, a tender evaluation committee member is indifferent between two tenders where one has 
the lowest offer price but is one percent higher in the changeover cost than the incumbent tender which 
is 1.51 percent higher in the offer price.  
 
In addition to the marginal rate of substitution reported above, the mean direct elasticities are also of 
interest. The direct elasticity of the probability of choosing an operator with respect to the offer price is 
-0.61, suggesting that the probability that an operator being selected will decrease by 0.61 percent if its 
offer price is one percent higher than the lowest offer price. The direct elasticity with respect to the 
changeover cost mark up is -0.89, and with respect to the success rate it is -0.33. These elasticities are 
interpreted in the same way as the offer price elasticity.  
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7. Conclusions and Implications 
 
This paper provides evidence that evaluators on tender evaluation committees do recognise the inherent 
risks in changing the service provider in bus contracts, and that it is possible to quantify the financial 
trade-off that evaluators make in balancing the risk associated with transition and disruption and the 
offer price. For example, if we take the median marginal rate of substitution between changeover cost 
and offer price of 1.51, then the prices offered by a new provider might be adjusted upwards by the 
evaluation committee in their recognition of the impact of uncertainty due to expected risk of incurring 
transition costs from change of incumbent, with the adjusted amount depending on the lowest offer 
price. For example, if the lowest offer price was $120m, with the offer price of the incumbent being 
$135m, or 12.5 percent higher than the lowest price, then to be preferred as a new operator, the estimated 
changeover cost associated with the non-incumbent operator must be smaller than 12.5/1.51 = 8.3 
percent of the lowest offer price (or equivalent to 8.3 percent ×$120m = $9.96m). Alternatively, if the 
tender with lowest offer price has an estimated cost of changeover equivalent to 10% of their offer 
price13, their risk normalised offer price is $120m + 10%×120×1.51 = $138.1m, which is higher than 
the incumbent’s price and therefore the incumbent is preferred. The extent to which the non-incumbent 
offer prices are adjusted will depend on the lowest offer price and the risk profiles of the evaluation 
committee. 
 
In ongoing research, we are hoping to increase the number of participating evaluators and to condition 
the attributes associated with the choice scenarios with the contextual setting associated with country, 
other KPIs and evaluator experience. The current sample size does not offer enough variation in the 
data items outside of the choice experiments to be able to test for these other potential influences; 
however we anticipate that this will temper the current evidence but not nullify it. A further research 
task is to obtain ex post evidence of the magnitude (in absolute and relative terms) of the mark up 
required to account for the risk differential between an incumbent and a potential new entrant. This is 
likely to be jurisdiction specific, but will be necessary to identify a meaningful risk normalised offer 
price that is a true reflection of the lowest offer price (regardless of what other criteria are used in 
assessing offers)14. 
13 We currently have no indication of the real world changeover cost mark up, and hence this is an illustrative 
example only.  
14 The recent competive tendering of bus services in Singapore (see Goh et al. 2015) selected the operator who 
was not the least expensive but the third least expensive, with service quality and other considerations such as 
training being taken into account in a multidimensional evaluation process using a the method of Analytical 
Hierarachical Processes. A gross cost model (with contracts  between 5 and 7 years) was used with government 
providing bus infrastructure (depots and interchanges), buses, fleet management system and ticketing system 
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